

\*ARMY Declass/Release  
Instructions On File\*

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## TAB A

"2. The relationship of estimated killed by air (EKA) to actual killed by air (AKA)." (S)

STAG Comment: (TS) The data available allowed no accurate evaluation of the difference between estimated killed by air and actual killed by air. It is obvious from a review of SITREPS and MILREPS that estimated kills compared to confirmed kills vary widely. Further, even those claimed kills that are supposedly confirmed have little relation to the totals listed in the DOD Statistical Summary. For example, the Weekly MACV MILREPS for the 29-day period, 10 July to 7 August, listed the killed by air (KBA) figures and sorties flown as follows:

a. Four thousand four hundred twenty-two KBA were reported during the period. Unfortunately, estimated vs. confirmed kills could not be separated in all cases. However, it is interesting to note that the DOD Statistical Summary reported a weekly average of 601 KIA per week during the third quarter of CY-65, or 2,404 KIA reported for a 28-day period. These statistics include KIA by all type actions, from this it would appear that KBA figures are overstated by at least 100 percent for this 28-day period.

b. It is of further interest that the MILREPS for this 28-day period reported 8,720 strike sorties flown in CAS, armed recce, and interdiction, with the KBAs reported from each of these mission types. This represents about 1 KBA for each 2 sorties flown.

c. VC KIA reported by DOD Statistical Summary for the period 1962 to present are as follows:

- (1) 1962: 21,158
- (2) 1963: 20,575
- (3) 1964: 16,785
- (4) 1965: 31,252 (based on 601 weekly average)

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d. USAF/VNAF strike sorties flown during the same period are as follows:

- (1) 1962: 7,092
- (2) 1963: 16,032
- (3) 1964: 14,088
- (4) 1965: 81,483 (up to 25 November 1965)

e. US ground strength increase is as follows:

- (1) 1962: 11.3%
- (2) 1963: 16.3%
- (3) 1964: 23.3%
- (4) 1965: 166.2%

f. The VC KIA during the years 1962 to 1964 remain fairly constant.

The sorties flown during this same period rose 100 percent between 1962 and 1963, dropped 13 percent in 1964, and increased 478 percent in 1965, yet VC KIA increased only 100 percent in the same period. Battalion-size ground operations increased slightly in 1965 over 1964 but the intensity of these actions increased considerably during the last half of 1965.

g. From this it can be concluded that:

(1) VC KBA as reported do not represent realistic figures.

(2) VC KIA by all methods, e.g., ground action and air action, increased significantly.

(3) The rise in sorties flown is not in the same proportion as the rise in KIA.

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